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Abstract. Compression has been advocated as one of the principles
which pervades inductive inference and prediction - and, from there, it
has also been recurrent in definitions and tests of intelligence. However,
this connection is less explicit in new approaches to intelligence. In this
paper, we advocate that the notion of compression can appear again
in definitions and tests of intelligence through the concepts of ‘mind-
reading’ and ‘communication’ in the context of multi-agent systems and
social environments. Our main position is that two-part Minimum Mes-
sage Length (MML) compression is not only more natural and effective
for agents with limited resources, but it is also much more appropriate for
agents in (co-operative) social environments than one-part compression
schemes - particularly those using a posterior-weighted mixture of all
available models following Solomonoff’s theory of prediction. We think
that the realisation of these differences is important to avoid a naive
view of ‘intelligence as compression’ in favour of a better understanding
of how, why and where (one-part or two-part, lossless or lossy) compres-
sion is needed.
Keywords: two-part compression, Minimum Message Length (MML),
Solomonoff theory of prediction, tests of intelligence, communication.
1 Compression, inference, prediction and intelligence
Several authors [1, 5, 6, 11, 7, 9] have suggested the relevance of compression to
intelligence, especially the inductive inferential (or inductive learning) part of
intelligence. M. Hutter even proposed a compression contest (the Hutter prize)
which was “motivated by the fact that being able to compress well is closely
related to acting intelligently” (http://prize.hutter1.net) [2, footnote 180].
However, many compression algorithms are able to compress data in a much
better way than humans (either lossless or lossy compression). Humans are better
at compressing information which is relevant to their goals (or rewards). So,
many agree that compression must have a role, but it is not clear which kind of
compression must be considered.
One position advocated is that two-part Minimum Message Length (MML)
compression [26, 28, 25, 4], which states the theory in the first part, gives the
inductive inference part of intelligence [5, 6]. Other authors have considered the
one-part Solomonoff predictive compression [20] to be the appropriate way of us-
ing the data for modelling, perhaps due to its emphasis on prediction rather than
explanation and its presumed consequent superiority in predicting the future.
The relationship between MML and Kolmogorov complexity, the similarities
between Wallace’s MML inference/explanation work and Solomonoff’s predictive
work – and the subtle difference between inference/explanation and prediction –
have been discussed in [28][25, chap. 2]. In short, Solomonoff will take a posterior-
weighted mixture of all available models, and so his predictive approach will
typically involve something which is not one of the available models - whereas
the Wallace MML approach will use the single best available model. Technically,
a mixture of models may not compress at all, since encoding all (or a great
number of) the possible models may require more bits than the data itself.
In addition, there seems to be confusion amongst many authors about the
distinction between one-part and (MML) two-part compression. In one-part com-
pression, we simply wish to encode the data. In two-part (MML) compression,
we wish to encode the model in the first part of the message and then we encode
the data given the model in the second part of the message [28][25, chap. 2]. An
alternative way of describing the two-part coding is that a (possibly Universal)
Turing machine (TM) could read the first part of the message, whereupon it
would write nothing but rather go into an “educated” state or become an Edu-
cated Turing Machine (ETM) [25, chap. 2][28]. Upon reading the second part of
the message (which encodes the data), the (now Educated) TM would perform
a decoding and then write out the data.
However, in terms of a single agent operating in some environment, it will
clearly predict better (even if only slightly) when using the Solomonoff predic-
tive distribution. Nonetheless, if the agent is time-limited – as it typically will
be in a realistic environment – then there will be disadvantages to using the
entire Solomonoff posterior predictive distribution. Indeed, this will typically in-
volve infinite summations and – further – the uncomputability of the Halting
problem. It is worth mentioning, though, that some approximations can work in
practice (such as Monte Carlo AIXI [24]) by reducing the number of models in
the mixture.
Partly in response to Searle’s “Chinese room” argument [19], we also raise the
issue of compression as a non-behavioural (introspective) indicator of intelligence
- i.e., given two agents who have scored equally well on a test and one of which
compresses better than the other, which should we prefer [5, sec. 5.1][6, sec. 5][4,
sec. 7.3]?3 We compare this to other purely behavioural ways of assessing and
detecting intelligence.
3 We certainly note [16, sec. 5.2] that human society gives Nobel prizes and various
other accolades to those who give a good single theory (or MML explanation) for
observed data. Examples include (e.g.) special/general relativity, Helicobacter pylori
as the cause of stomach ulcers, etc.
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The rest of the paper analyses the relation between the several views and
applications of the notion of compression and intelligence, focussing on social
environments and communication.
2 Social environments and communication
Social environments and multi-agent systems generally include competition and
co-operation. For competition, it is necessary to have mind-reading abilities in
order to anticipate what other agents might do (predator-preys, games such as
the prisoners’ dilemma, etc.). While we could perhaps use a mixture of models
for these social environments as well, the other agents are resource-bounded, and
they will generally act according to a reduced number of models – or a single
one. Consequently, using a large mixture of models to explain and predict the
behaviour of other agents seems inefficient and unrealistic.
Nonetheless, it is in co-operation where the different approaches to inductive
inference and prediction perhaps become more apparent. First, co-operation im-
plies communication. In order to communicate a concept, we need an efficiently
compressed expression of the concept. We do not expect to transmit a mixture
of models but a single model. Second, in order to transmit (i.e., understand) the
concept, we need descriptions which are clearly separated from the data. Here,
a two-part compression seems to have advantages over a one-part compression,
since with the former it is easier to extract the concept or model we want to com-
municate. Third, in co-operation, agents need to share models and procedures.
In other words, agents should share the same ontology. This is only possible if
the ontology can be isolated from the data – and if it is the same for all.
Let us elaborate upon the points from the above paragraph with some ex-
amples. The creation of language is about developing a set of (hierarchical)
concepts for the purposes of concise description of the observed world and corre-
spondingly concise communication. Elaborating upon the ideas outlined in [25,
chap. 9] (and [2, footnote 128][4, sec. 7.2]), this can be thought of as a problem
of (hierarchical) intrinsic classification or (hierarchical) mixture modelling (or
clustering), where we might identify classes such as (e.g.) animal, vegetable, min-
eral, animal-dog, animal-cat, vegetable-carrot, vegetable-potato, vegetable-fruit,
mineral-metal, mineral-salt, animal-dog-labrador, animal-dog-collie, animal-dog-
labrador-black, animal-dog-labrador-golden, etc. Following these principles of
MML mixture modelling [26, 27, 29, 25] enables us to arrive at a single theory,
which is the first part of an MML message and which describes the concepts or
classes. The data of all the various individual animals, vegetables and minerals
(or things) on the planet (such as their heights and weights, etc.) is encoded in
the second part of the message. Users of the language are free to communicate
the concepts from this single best MML theory.
Knowledge (and human knowledge especially) in a social environment is all
about this, about sharing models. And this shared knowledge makes co-operation
possible. For humans (elevated in knowledge), science is a type of knowledge
where we typically use one theory to explain the evidence, and not hundreds.
3
Despite the rationale that one model (or a small set of models) is better for
resource-bounded agents which need to communicate their concepts, there are
some other issues around compression and intelligence that are more difficult to
dissect.
2.1 Lossless and lossy compression
In other areas of computer science (image, audio and video processing in par-
ticular), we clearly distinguish between lossless and lossy compression [17, 15].
In inductive inference, this distinction is less clear. Prediction and inference can
also be defined and performed in noisy environments, where some details have
to be lost to avoid overfitting (see, e.g., [25, sec. 4.9]). This is, of course, one
of the rationales behind two-part codes, where the theory part could be seen
as the lossy compression and the other part could be seen as the detail which
(optionally) is used to cover the rest of the data. In fact, some compression
schemes may have more than two parts, with each part adding more detail to
the previous part, in a hierarchical way (although the MML message could be
re-structured so that this is again in two parts). Perception is a clear example
of this as well, especially because the world deals with continuous (non-discrete)
sources of data.
One issue which is difficult to isolate is the ‘distortion criterion’ [17] for
lossy compression. In image, audio and video compression, the distortion and
quality criteria are set by human perception - i.e., what kind of loss is acceptable
depending on the application. If this external reference is lost, it is much more
difficult to distinguish the information that can be lost from the information that
should be preserved. Perception and intelligence must be able to determine the
details which are relevant to an agent’s actions and those which are completely
irrelevant - i.e., agents must perform selectively lossy compression. Memory and
everyday linguistic concepts must also be able to drop details and keep the
essential. The mechanisms and principles which should guide all this are yet to
be discovered. In many codings which are used in reinforcement learning (e.g. [21,
22]), compression is used to code future rewards efficiently, so any detail which
is irrelevant to predict future rewards can be dropped. In fact, this link between
compression and reinforcement can be made explicit [8]. Again, compression is
required, but the precise formulation and application is crucial.
2.2 The elusive model paradox and (human) unpredictability
The interaction between predator and prey, between sellers and buyers, or the
behaviour which takes place in board or mind games (such as the prisoners’
dilemma) has been analysed in ethology, economics, game theory, artificial intel-
ligence and other disciplines. We can discuss all this in terms of prediction and
compression.
For example, Scriven discusses the notion of (human) predictability [18] in
one of the simplest possible social environments: an iterated game of two hu-
mans with one trying to do what the other does and the other trying to avoid
4
this happening. Scriven finds an apparent logical paradox that both should be
able to predict the other, while Lewis and Shelby Richardson [13] note Scriven’s
assumption that the calculations done by each agent in modelling the other are
required to terminate. Indeed, whether one looks at doing two-part MML in-
ferential modelling or Solomonoff predictive modelling, one ultimately runs into
the Halting problem (or Entscheidungsproblem) [2, footnote 211][3, p455][4, sec.
7.5] - and (the paradox is circumvented by the fact that) the relevant calcula-
tions will not terminate. The ability to recognise “other minds” and engage in
“mind-reading” is clearly advantageous in general in social environments. It is
presumably of little surprise that two competing agents of equal computational
power and equal inference (modelling) or predictive technique have no advantage
over one another.
3 Detecting and assessing intelligence
The understanding of compression as a necessary trait of intelligence has led
to some approaches for detecting and assessing intelligence where compression
plays a fundamental role. Some of these approaches are non-behavioural, i.e.,
introspective, and require an analysis of the models the agent is using. In fact,
the analysis of the level of compression in the models was used as a response
to Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument [19]. In [5, sec. 2.1][6, sec. 2][4, sec. 7.3],
compression was advocated as a non-behavioural way of assessing and detecting
intelligence. This required measuring the bits of the model the agents are using,
if we are comparing them. This idea is even more explicit in the Hutter prize
(http://prize.hutter1.net) [2, footnote 180]. In general, however, it is not
possible to precisely measure the length of a model by introspection, since the
inner knowledge representation may not be accessible. Even for artificial agents,
this might be impractical as agents become more and more complex.
One possible way to overcome this limitation is through the use of language.
Through language we can ask and communicate models and see whether the
explanation for a phenomenon (or an action) given by an agent is shorter than the
explanation given by another agent. In fact, interviews, exams and other kinds of
tests commonly tell between rote learning and full comprehension by requesting
an explanation for the answers, which can then be compared to the right model.
This is also recurrent in the Turing Test [23, 14] and its implementations, where
the artificial agents frequently fail when they are asked to give explanations.
This is well-known in psychology as well, where there are many introspective
techniques based on asking the right questions.
The other possible way is to stick to purely behavioural tests, which are
completely independent from the nature of the agents. Psychometric tests are
generally behavioural, since subjects only need to guess answers right or wrong.
Many evaluation settings in artificial intelligence are also behavioural, such as
game contests, robot competitions, reinforcement learning evaluation, etc. Al-
though behavioural tests seem to be disconnected from the notion of compres-
sion, the links arise again in many and diverse ways. Firstly, since prediction
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and compression are linked, performance is better for those systems which are
able to compress the evidence (in a goal-oriented way). Secondly, the difficulty of
the exercises or tasks which are used to detect intelligence can be approximated
using notions which are closely related to compression, such as many variants of
Kolmogorov complexity. Finally, the distribution of tasks can be obtained using
some kind of universal distribution. All this has been explored by [11, 7, 9, 12,
10], where the original static (sequence-prediction) tests have evolved into more
interactive and adaptive tests.
Finally, it is insightful (as an extreme case) to see whether (and how) intel-
ligence can be detected through a (slow) uni-directional form of communication
- where, rather than having interactive conversation, instead we send a message
conveying some information which we hope is understood. When no previous
knowledge is shared, this seems impossible due to the lack of common refer-
ences. However, compression is again advocated as a possibility to make this
feasible, even in the case of uni-directional messages4.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed the role that compression might have in intelli-
gence, with an emphasis on communication and language, and the exchange and
evaluation of models.
We have argued that the ability to do two-part (MML) compression is (in
general) an advantage in social environments. It is an advantage firstly for the
same reasons that it is an advantage in an isolated environment of one agent, in-
cluding the fact that the MML-inferred theory is a good predictor. But, secondly,
it will also typically be an advantage in the (co-operative) social environment,
where we can teach (or tell or show) our theories to others. One interesting area
of research would be to follow the ideas in Monte Carlo AIXI [24] and construct
MML agents, and see whether the latter behave better (with the same resources)
in social environments.
Hence, while agreeing that both the optimal Solomonoff predictor and the
Wallace MML inference are both relevant to at least the inductive inference (or
inductive learning) part of intelligence, we take the position here of suggesting
that – at least in the context of social agents in a multi-agent environment –
MML is perhaps more pertinent to what we (as social humans in our multi-
human environment) might commonly refer to as ‘intelligence’.
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